


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## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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Yugoslav Party Criticizes Portuguese Leftists

*Komunist*, the official Yugoslav party weekly, has openly stated Belgrade's misgivings about disunity among the leading "progressive" forces in Lisbon and placed the bulk of the blame on the Armed Forces Movement.

The weekly argues that "it would be wrong and dangerous" to give exclusive credit to the Armed Forces Movement for "progress" and simultaneously to denounce the socialists as reactionaries. The article mildly raps the socialists, however, for "incorrectly" assuming that they have a monopoly on democracy.

The Yugoslav party asserts that there is much more at stake than a narrow squabble between Portuguese factions. To support this conclusion, *Komunist* listed such related concerns as the potential impact of events in Lisbon on the post-Franco period in Spain, the activities of the French and Italian left, and the de-colonization of Angola.

Belgrade has long held serious reservations about trends in the Portuguese revolution--particularly the radical programs that the Portuguese Communists espouse. In essence, the Yugoslavs would prefer to see Portugal remain a stable member of NATO, especially as the Soviets seek to tighten their control over the Warsaw Pact.

The Yugoslavs' decision to publish their view, despite their earlier sermons on the evils of foreign meddling in Portugal, probably reflects Belgrade's realization that nobody is abiding by their advice.



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Albania Rebuffs Soviet Overtures

Tirana has forcefully restated its complete disinterest in closer cooperation with Moscow and the Kremlin's loyalist East European allies. An authoritative article in *Zeri i Popullit*, the party daily, also serves notice on any members of the leadership who may favor closer cooperation with Moscow.

In a commentary laced with vitriol, Tirana has responded to what it calls the "flatteries" and "pressures" of the Soviets and other "revisionists," who seek, by offering economic advantages, to seduce Albania into changing its strongly anti-Soviet stance. The article claims that the Albanian people are determined "to make any sacrifice"--as they have done in the past--to preserve their freedom and independence, including relying on their own capabilities to bolster economic development.

25X1 The timing of the commentary is significant. The article probably is intended to rebuff Moscow's reported interest in normalizing relations with Tirana [redacted] Given signs of a continuing challenge to Albanian leader Hoxha, the article warns pro-Soviet comrades to abandon hope for closer cooperation with Moscow or else face the consequences. The commentary stresses that compromising the country's policy to promote trade and obtain favorable credits will not cure the country's economic ills. Former defense minister Balluku, who was ousted from his post in July 1974, and his sympathizers may well have supported this position.


The commentary, released on the eve of the Helsinki summit, provides a timely rationale for Albania's abstention from the European security talks. Tirana, having repeatedly described the

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talks as a "superpower charade," has used this occasion to rebuke the secret diplomacy of countries who willingly put their national interests "up for auction."



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Romania: The July Plenum

There was a certain malaise about the party central committee plenum on July 21-22 that suggests some policies of party chief Ceausescu came under criticism. The Romanian leader responded by seeking to shift the blame for difficulties in the economic sector as well as in the flood control program to a number of national and local officials. Although no one lost his job at the plenum, the stage appears to be set for future personnel shifts.

The Romanian leader's obsession with meeting the goals of the current economic plan ahead of schedule despite the damaging effects of the country's recent severe floods has probably increased his vulnerability to critics. There is no evidence of organized opposition, but Ceausescu's main speech to the plenum struck a rare defensive pose by juxtaposing his regime's "miraculous" economic accomplishments with the "reservations and scepticism" of some members of the leadership. This highly unusual admission follows recent rumors of friction between unnamed members of the party's powerful political executive committee over Ceausescu's decision to increase prices earlier this month and the growing behind-the-scenes role of his wife, Elena, in party and state affairs.

Ceausescu's remarks also suggest that he thought it prudent to give greater consideration to the views of others in the leadership before calling for changes at the plenum. A number of personnel shifts may, however, still be made. Ceausescu called for "decisive action" against a number of local officials for their failures during the floods. A prime target is Virgil Trofin, a well-known Ceausescu critic and the party first secretary of Brasov county.

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Much of Ceausescu's speech turned out to be a pep-talk heavily laced with references to the need for better party organization and tighter discipline. With this goal in mind, the plenum reorganized the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development, parceling out specific responsibilities to the fifteen members of the party's political executive committee.

The 1976-80 five-year plan, as outlined by Ceausescu, holds out little hope of relief to the already hard-pressed Romanian worker. For instance, in contrast to popular expectations, there will be no shortening of the six-day work week. Ceausescu called for further belt tightening and indicated that some of the economic goals spelled out at the 11th party congress last November have been raised. Ceausescu also announced tighter import restrictions in what seems destined to be a vain effort to balance the nation's payments position by the end of the year.



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